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RECENT EXERCISES IN GROWTH ACCOUNTING:
NEW UNDERSTANDING OR DEAD END?*
Richard R. Nelson

?he growth accounting literature has been enriched recently by several
major quantitative studies, and a sophisticated technical dialogue. l

The

obvious high quality of this work may lead some economists to think that
great progress has been made in our understanding of economic growth and
that we are nearly home.

I suggest that while recent research has increased

our knowledge, studies of this sort have run into sharply diminishing returns
and soon will arrive at a dead end leaving many essential open questions.
In Section I, I will consider some basic difficulties with growth accounting.
Several of the points raised here have been raised before but appear to have
been repressed in the recent discussions; it seems important to introduce
them again to the dialogue.

Most growth accounting purports to rest on the

nee-classical theory of economic growth.

In Section II, I shall argue that

this theory is more a way of looking at things than a real theory, and that
neo-classical spectacles may distort or block perception of phenomena that
should be at the center of a serious theory of economic growth.

I shall conclude

by providing a preliminary sketch of a proposed growth theory built on
Schumpeterian rather than neo-clas.sical perceptiotts.

Some Basic Limitations of Growth Accounting
The logic behind growth accounting appears to be simple, but appearances

*The author is indebted to C. Diaz Alejandro, R. Evenson, w. Fellner
1

Y. Kislev, W. Nordhaus, and J. Tobin for useful discussion and criticism.
of these necessarily agrees with all or any of the thrust of this paper.

None
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are deceiving.

In this section I shall discuss two basic difficulties of

growth accounting.

One is the problem of distinguishing between movements
The second is the

along a production function and shifts in that function.

problem of treating experienced growth as the sum of the contributions
made by separate factors.
The problem of competing explanations.

From its beginnings growth

accounting has been concerned with trying to estimate how much of growth
can be explained by movements along a production function, and how much can
be attributed, at least in part, to advances in technological and organizational
competence,

The early studies recognized quite explicitly the difficulties,

perhaps even the theoretical impossibility, of distinguishing between alternative
explanations of observed growth patterns without rather strong a priori
.

assump t ions.

2

The growth patterns here refer to time series data.

The a priori

assumptions could come from cross section data or other empirical sources.
Some of the recent studies appear to give the impression that on the basis
of rather weak a priori assumptions there is a theoretically correct way of
distinguishing movements along a production function from shifts in it.
It seems important, therefore, to review the basic problem.
The discussion here will not be focussed on any particular study or set
of numbers but on the general problem.

The difficulty can be seen sharply

if one assumes the following stylized aggregative facts.

3

Output (GNP) has

been growing at the same rate as capital and at a faster rate than labor;
hence the capital output ratio has been constant and output per worker and
the capital-labor ratio have been rising.

Factor shares have remained constant;
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thus the rate of return on capital has been constant and the wage rate has
risen.

These "facts" very roughly characterize the U.S. growth experience that

the accounting exercises seek to explain.

Consider the following two com

peting explanations, both consistent with the time series data.

One is

that the underlying production function is Cobb-Douglas (of unitary elasticity
of substitution) and technical change has been neutral in the sense of Hicks.
The second is that the underlying production function has an elasticity of
substitution less than one, and that technical change has been labor saving.
The differences between the explanations can be seen in terms of how
they explain growth of output per worker.

The first interpretation is

depicted in Figure 1, the second in Figure 2,

Points (a) and (b) in the

two figures are identical and the slopes of the curves (the marginal productivity
of capital) at those points also are identical..

However the curve in Figure 1

that goes through point (a) shows a greater tendency to diminishing returns
than the curve of Figure 1 (the elasticity of substitution between capital
and labor is lower).

Also, the curve through (b) in Figure 2 does not represent

an equal proportiocal increase in output per worker for each capital-labor
ratio compared with the curve through point (a).

Rather the proportional

increase is greater for a high capital··labor ratio than for low (technical
change has been labor saving)"
The two interpretations are different in the following "growth accounting"
sense.

In the case of Figure 1 output per worker would have grown by ~ll if

capital per worker had grown as it did, cut the production function had not
shifted.

~
represents the increase in output per worker not explained by
12

growth of the capital-labor ratio and hance due, in some sense, to technical
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change.
and 6

22

In Figure 2, Li

21

can be attributed to growth of capital per worker

to technological change in the sense above.

File for future

reference that the "contribution" of technical change is estimated by subtracting
the contribution of other factors.

This aside, under the first interpre-

tation a larger fraction of productivity growth is attributed to growth of
capital intensity.

In the latter interpretation the lower elasticity of

substitution means that less of productivity growth can be attributed to
g~owing capital intensity, hence more must be attributed to improved technology.
As Diamond, McFadden, and Rodriguez (among others) have pointed out, since

both interpretations are equally consistent with the data there is no way
to choose among them, without a priori assumptions.

Thus the growth accounting

is arbitrary.
The discussion above r.ts not dealt explicitly with an important char
acteristic of many recent growth accounting exercises; the attempt to take
into account increases in factor quality as well as quantity.
the same issues are involved.

But exactly

The way quality changes are handled (in principle

at least) in the recent literature is to divide gross factors into subgroups
of different quality and estimate the expansion of each.

Thus the quality

problem is translated into a disaggregation of quantity problem.

4

All of

the preceeding discussion applies.
In fact the growth accounting exercises have not proceeded by attempting
to specify a particular "production function" and estimate its parameters.
Rather the strategy is somehow to build up an input "index" that measures
the contribution of input growth to output growth without explicit committment
to a particular production function.

There is a semantic problem here.
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The "input index" really is an estimate of output under the assumption of
constant technology.

In any case this research methodology does not av6id

the problem but simply evades it.
The use of a particular weighting or index scheme for input growth is
the growth accountant's de facto assumption about the shape of the production
function.

A starting place for all growth accounting is the assumption

that, if the neo-classical theory holds, at any time factor prices equal
marginal productivities.
prices.

But prices when?

Thus it is natural to weight factor inputs by their
They are likely to vary over the period in question.

One could use inietial price weights.

If one did this one would be in effect

assuming that the production function followed the tangent at point (a) in
Figures 1 and 2.

If there were any curvature at all to the function this

procedure would lead to an overestimate of the contribution of input growth
and an underassessment of the contribution of technological change.

Or one

could weight percentage input growth by the initial "share" of income.

In

effect this would be assuming that the production function was Cobb-Douglas.
Both of these assumptions obviously are arbitrary and lead to arbitrary growth
accounting.
There seems to be a belief that the use of Divisia indices gets around
this problem.

5

The Divisia index in theory weights inputs at any moment

of time by their prices at that moment.

While more traditional indices use

(arbitrary) fixed weights, the Divisia index uses continuously changing
weights.

There are many reasons why the Divisia index is appealing.

However

the use of the Divisia index does not resolve the problem.
Ideally in using the Divisia method one would estimate the instantaneous

-7-

rate of productio n function shift by the method proposed by Solow--pe rcentage
output increase minus factor share weighted percentag e input growth.
l)

dA
A

= dQ _
Q

S

dL

_

L L

Integrati on then would yield a moving index of total factor productiv ity.
In practice factor price weights cannot be re-estima ted continuou sly but on
a yearly (or other periodic) basis.

This amounts to a de facto assumptio n

that within periods the productio n function is Cobb-Dou glas.

Thus this

procedure means that within each sub-perio d the contribut ion of input growth
and technolog y shift is estimated on the basis of interpret ation la.

This

clearly is arbitrary , but can be rationaliz ed by appeal to a "Taylor's series"
argument, and in any case is not the basic problem.
If time intervals are short the differenc e between the intra-per iod
interpret ations shrinks.

In the limit, for infinitesi mally small proportio nal

input changes (and changes in technolog y), we cannot distingui sh between
the different interpret ations; they yield the same attributio n.

This is so

because we are moving along curves with initially the same slope, and for small
changes in inputs even large differenc es in curvature (elastici ties of
substitut ion) will not show up.

But if the total attributio n is over a

finite period of time, the fact that the overall period is divided up into
a large number of very short periods does not help at all.

As the sub-time

periods shrink and the intra-per iod di=ferenc es get smaller, a larger number
of these need to be added up over the total period.
away.

The problem does not go

Nor would the problem disappear if we didn't have to worry about the

practical reality of finite sub-perio ds.

It is the finitenes s of the total
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comparison period that causes the difficulty.
The dashed lines between points (a) and (b) in Figures 1 and 2 are
identical.

They are meant to represent a smooth growth of output and input

between two discreetly different points of time.

Both time paths will yield

the same Divisia index series of inputs, since along the path inputs and
factor prices (shares) are the same.

The Divisia index series for inputs

is, in several recent studies, the implicit specification of output growth,
had technology not changed.
share is constant.

Under our stylized data assumptions capital's

This means that the Divisia index of inputs moves like

a Cobb-Douglas with constant output elasticities, or along the curve through
point (1) in Figure 2~ The use of the ~ivisia index for inputs thus
will yield the attribution of growth to increased factor inputs and to
technical change of Figure 1.

But the data are consistent as well with

Figure 2.

The problem lies in the failure of the Divisia formula for an .index
of technology to face up to the basic problem.

Integrating the Solow

instantaneous technical change equation yields:

2)

log A(T) - log A(o)

=

log Q(t)
dt

SL(t) d log L(t)
dt

However the time path of factor shares is what it is because of both changes
in factor ratios and technological change.

The Divisia formula fails to

distinguish between alternative explanations of factor shares.

Thus under

the interpretation of Figure 2 the capital share would have fallen but for
the fact that technical change was capital using.

If one wants to attribute
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to factor growth only what output growth would have been had technology been
constant, then one must use in equation (2) not actual "shares," but the time
path of shares as they would have been had technology not changed. 7

But

to do this requires that one be able to specify the original production function
which was the original impass.
The route out of the impass requires more specificatio n based on other
data.

For example, one could attempt to estimate the elasticity of substitutio n

from engineering design data.

Or, if one had access to cross-sectio n data

on outputs and inputs as well as time series data, under certain assumptions
one might be able to sort out the shape of the production function from
shifts in that function.
facilitate discriminat ion.

Assumptions about momentum or independenc e can
One can assume that variation in the rate of

change of the capital-lab or ratio is large relative to variation in the pace
and character of technical advance, or that movements in the two are independent
of each other.

Then if one found that when the capital-lab or ratio increased

rapidly there was a fall in capital share, but when the capital-lab or ratio
increased by the same amount but over a longer period of time (more slowly)
there was no fall in the share, this would be evidence that the elasticity
of substitutio n was less than one and that technical change was labor saving.
This is Fellner's approach in a recent paper (1971).

In any case, in order

to do growth accounting in a non-arbitra ry way we need knowledge that goes

beyond the data that are used in the growth accounting.
The meaning of growth attribution .
described above is solved.
question:

Let us assume that the problem

Then it would be possible to pose the following

how much growth would we have experienced had only technology
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changed, or enly capital, or only labor, or only capital and labor, or various
other combinations of factors.
would give to the answers.

However it is uncertain what meaning one

If by attribution to a particular factor we mean the

growth that would have occurred had it alone changed, the relative attribution
to growth of different factors is not independent of the time period in
question, even if all factors are changing at a constant rate.
while using this meaning of attribution

Further,

the sum of the attributions adds

up to total growth for very small time periods,they may not add up to total
growth if finite time periods are considered.

These points were raised earlier

by Levine and Massell, but seem to have been ignored in the recent discussion.
The recent literature appears to get around the problem by posing the
attribution problem in a different way.

Hou much of the average yearly growth

rate that we have experienced would we have attained if durine an average
year technology alone had advanced at its average rate, or capital alone,
etc.?

While this resolves the technical problem it of course does not solve

the basic problem that the very meaning of a growth attribution is obscure.
Assume that interpretation 2 is known to be correct, that the production
function is Cobb-Douglas and technical advance is neutral, and that all
factors were growing at constant rates.

Assume that by attribution to a

factor we mean the amount of output growth that would have occurred had that
factor alone changed.

Measure the instantaneous growth rates associated

with the yearly growth rates of capital and labor.

Label these AK and AL.

Estimate the instantaneous rate of technical progress by the Solow method
using the instantaneous rate of output growth.

Call this AA.

In the case

of infinitesimally small changes the attribution to technical advance
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relative to capital growth can be expressed as follows:
3a)

Attribution to Technical Advance
Attribution to Capital Growth

=

And the following expression tells how much of total growth was contributed
by technical change:
4a)

Attribution to Technical Advance
Total Growth

=

All this is nice and neat, with attributions to individual factors adding
up to total growth.
All the neatness goes when finite time periods are considered.

For

capital and technological change the attribution ratio is as follows:
AAT
3b)

Attribution to Technical Advance
Attribution to Capital Growth

=

e
e

As T

➔

- 1

AKSKT

- 1

0 the ratio refers to very small changes and should asymptotically

yield expression 3a.

Since both nu112rator

and denominator go to zero,

l'Hopital's rule must be applied. Then it is seen that as T ➔ 0 the attribution
AA
ratio does approach sT. However assume finite T. Then the ratio is
KK
different. Indeed as T increases the expression increase5 toward infinity
or falls to zero as AA exceeds or falls short of AKSK.

Relative attributions

to different factors are sensitive to the time period in question.
Notice also that under our concept of attribution, over a finite period
of time total growth may not be attributable to the separate factors.

Indeed

in the Cobb-Douglas case the percentage of total growth explained by growth
of any particular factor, with the others held constant, shrinks to zero
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as the time period increases.
4b)

For technical advance, for example:

Attribution to Technical Advance
Total Growth

=
- 1

This expression clearly goes to zero as T increases.
At first glance all this seems strange, but it is not.

Growth accounting

simply does not get at what some practitioners seem to claim it gets at-
relative contributions to growth of different factors.

It does not get at

that question because the question has no answer if we are interested in
finite changes over a finite period.
plcgued

The problem here is the same one that

the profession many years ago when it was trying to attribute total product

(rather than growth) between the different factors.
this was impossible.

We learned then that

We could attribute at the margin.

But there was no

way of attributing shares of the total.
To see the problem from another perspective look again at Figure 1
and assume the time period is one year.

6

11

measures how much output would

have grown had technology remained constant.
of equation 3b.

6

12

It is analogous to the numerator

is the measure of the contribution of technological

change measured as a residual, but it does not measure how much output would
have grown over the year had capital remained constant.
to the denominator in equation 3b.
measures that.
changes.

Call this ~ *.
12

The distance between points (c) and (a)

This is the same as 6

For finite changes, even a year, 6

total growth.

It is not analogous

11

plus 6

12

12

only for very small

* do not add up to

To get total growth one must add an "interaction term."

The standard growth accounting appears to get around this problem,
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but it does not.

In the first place the conversion to an average yearly

change rather than an instantaneous change means that for that average year
the "contribution of technical change" overestimates what growth would have
been had factors actually remained constant over that year; ~
12 exceeds ~12*.
But this discrepancy is very small. The real problem is that the contribution
of technical change to growth, or of expansion of any particular factor,
during any year is not independent of what ha·ppened to the other factors
prior to that year.

Let us continue to assume interpretation 1 and constant

rates of change of the factors of production and technology.
a year toward the end of the accounting period.

.Consider

The contribution of say capital

during that year is as large as it is because labor and technology had advanced
during the prior periods as much as they did. 8
The attempt to get numbers for the contribution of different factors
to the growth process rests on misspecification of the process.

Experienced

growth is not the simple sum of the contributions of separate factors.
In the Cobb-Douglas neutral technical change case all factors are complements.
A finite increase in labor increases the output expansion that will result from
a finite increase in capital, and vice versa.

Technological advance and

factor increase are also complementary, the first increases the marginal
productivity of the second, the second increases the gain from a given percentage
increase in total factor productivity.

In this Cobb-Douglas neutral technical

change case one certainly can go through the technical operations of attributing
average yearly growth to a sum of average yearly contributions.

But the

meaning of such an attribution is quite unclear for considering finite
growth•. One could say that over a finite period the contributions multiply,

rather than add.

But this is to admit that the "accounti ng" or "adding up"

metaphor is I!!islendin g.,

And unless one knows that the productio n function

is Cobb-Dou glas one doesn't know that the contribut ions "multiply ."

The

"division of credit" flavor of the growth accountin g becomes even more obscure
when one recognize s stronger forms of com~leme ntarity, like the requireme nt
for educated people t:o do research an<l developme nt, and of new physical
capital to embody new technolog y.
One could take the position that the degree of interactio n among the
factors is small, and that the seperable contribut ions of the different
factors are like the first terms of a Taylor's expansion .

This is a plausible

position but rests on an assertion about the nature of the productio n function
and about technical change.

The approxima tion might be good, and it might

be poor.
The thrust of these remarks is no_!:_ that growth accountin g is unillumin ating.
Growth accountinG has been ext~emely useful in knocking down simple-mi nded
notions.

The early uork of Abramowitz~ Solow, and Kendrick demonstra ted

that there almost surely had to be more to grouth than simple augmentat ion
of physical capital and labor.

Denison and Griliches mapped out a list of

possible factors, and soci.e plausible rough estimc,tes of their importanc e.
Griliches and Jorg2nson have contribut ed significa ntly to ou:-:.- knowledge of
the time path of cert2in of the factors bei1 ind growth.

~hanges over time

in the estimated averagQ yearly contribut ion L1ade by different factors, in
particula r variation s in the residual, ar8 interestin g and suggestiv e facts
to know about, as are cross country and cross indt:.:stry differenc es.
Assumptio ns about momentum ~nd independe nce permit some rough inference
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drawing.

But some of the recent studies seem to imply that we can get more

than this from growth accounting, that somehow the growth accounts really
explain growth.

I do not see how they can.

We cannot get to a tested theory

of growth through growth accounting alone, and that particular route
strikes me as now at a stage of very low marginal return.

Do We Have a Growth Theory of a Plausible Kind?
In order to do non-arbitrary growth accounting, and to know if growth
accounting is a meaningful summary approximation to the sources of growth,
we need additional knowledge.

Ideally what we need is a tested growth theory

with confident estimates of parameter values.

If we had such a theory we

could do everything that growth accounting can do (although not all that
growth accounting purports to do).
can't do growth accounting.

And without such a theory we really

Almost all of growth accounting claims its

intellectual justification as the nee-classical theory of economic growth.
But does such a theory exist?

To the extent that it does exist in part, is

it believable?
Neo-classical theory as a point of view, not a theory.
theory do for us, if we had one?

What would a

In the first place we would expect the

theory to give an explanation, an account (if not an accounting) of past
growth.

This immediately poses the question--an account of what phenomena?

What needs to be explained?

Certainly the aggregative time series data

(at an economy or sector level) on output, input, and prices.

The data show

that beneath the aggregate (mean) figure for say labor productivity or
the profit rate there is a considerable dispersion of firms around the mean.
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I would argue that the theory ought to be at least consistent with, or better
explain, the disaggregated data.

r

would argue that the theory also ought

to be consistent with, or better explain, what we observe about process,
a point with which many might disagree, and to which I will return later.
What do we mean by an explanation?

I assume we mean computational

ability of the theory to replicate reasonably closely the phenomena to be
explained, given estimable parameter values.

But generally we want more of

a theory than just ability to replicate the past.

There may be alternative

explanations that it is interesting or important to distinguish among.

I

assume that an acceptable "explanation" does not leave unanswered questions
that economists find interesting, like the two probed in the preceding section,·
How much of the economic growth we have experienced would have been possible
in the absence of technological advance?

To what extent can the explanation

of growth be in terms of the contribution of different factors, or is this
misleading because growth involves a strongly complementary package of factors?
It is apparent that an interest in distinguishing among alternative explanations
of growth is highly influenced by our hope that the theory may be useful
to policy.

The two questions above have obvious significance to growth policy.

Limiting the present discussion to ability to explain the "macro"
data, I suggest that the neo-classical theory isn't really a theory.

In

particular different versions of the grab bag of things called neo-classical
theory answer these questions in different ways.
I suggest that the spirit of most of the growth accounting exercises
indicates de facto acceptance of a model that presumes considerable sustained
growth is possible without technical advance, and that factor complementarity

-17-

is not particularl y important.

The implicit theory is that output is a function

of technology, effective capital, and effective labor.

The elasticitie s of

substitutio n among capital of different qualities, and among labor of different
. f'inite.
.
9
quali ties, i s assumed to be in

The elasticity of substitutio n between

effective capital and effective labor implicitly is assumed to be relatively
high, probably in the neighborhoo d of unity, and certainly not close to zero.
There is considerabl e ambiguity regarding the connection between technical
advance and capital and labor quality.

Basically, however, growth accounting

as practiced makes sense only if it is assumed that the generation and
incorporatio n of new technology requires only modest amounts of new capital
and is not particularl y associated with labor of a particular kind or quality. 10
Under these specificatio ns growth of output per worker can continue so
long as the capital labor ratio grows,,

Actually the critical value of the

elasticity of substitutio n in a CES model is unity; if it is below this output
per worker for a constant technology is bounded"

However for analysis of

periods of a couple of decades at the rates of factor growth we have experienced ,
little deceleratio n of growth of output per worker would be experienced
at a constant growth of capital per worker, even for an elasticity of substitutio n
of as low as one half.

Siuil<'.rly the growth accounting interaction term

would not be particularl y important over s-cch a time period.

Growth of

output could be explained quite well as ::he sum of the separate contributio ns
of improved technology, anci j_ncrea.ses i;:i effective capital and labor.
Consider the following alternative model which is at almost an opposite
extreme regardinz thL two questions.

Solow, Tobin, Von We.izacker and Yaari

have proposed a model in which any productive increase in the capital
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intensity of production requires new technology.

If technological advance

stopped today output per worker would grow for a while as firms that had
been working with older capital shifted over to new and more productive
machines.

But once they had done this growth of output per worker would cease.

In this model new technology is needed in order to permit productive increase
in capital intensity but new technology cannot get into practice without new
capital.

Let me add to this structure the following.

The production and

installation of new technology requires educated workers; further in the absence
of technological advance educated workers would be doing nothing different
than uneducated workers and would not be more productive.
In this theory it is natural to think of technological advance as the
binding constraint on the Eystem; certainly growth would be impossible without
technical advance.

Traditional growth accounting would be nonsense, because

of the strong complementarity among technological change, capital growth, and
education.

To estimate,, the contribution of technical change by subtracting
',

an estimated contribution of increases capital and education clearly would
be absurd.
The differences between t'he models involve not only interpretation of
past experience, but prescription of how to improve future performance.

In

the first model it is natural to think of a number of different, and roughly
separable, factors that might increase the growth rate.

Choice among say

more Rand D, education, and more physical investment can be made on the basis
of rate of return, or cost benefit calculations.

While in the long run the

complementarity among the factors means that the rate of return on one is not
independent of the level of the others, for shorter run calculations this

can be ignored.

The second model forces policy thinking in terms of

complementary packages.

Thus a policy in support of Rand Dis thought

of as needing support by a policy of training scientists, and as being made
effective through policies to facilitate physical investment.

An interesting

example of a policy which, to be: successful, required a rather complex
package is the so called green revolution, as described by Hayami and
Ruttan.
To repeat the argument of the earlier sections, we cannot confidently
distinguish between these two opposite extremes on the basis of growth
accounting exercises and time series data alone.
are very impo:.::tant.

Yet the differences clearly

I suspect that, if we limit ourself to nee-classical

formulations, the right model is somewhere in between the two cases discussed
above, but for many sectors may be closer to the second model than the first.
We economists tend to be far too facile with our chalk (or equations)
in drawing isoquants into regions of factor proportions that never have been
experienced.

11

I would bet that in the absence of considerable research and

development reconnaissance of the terrain, firms venturing into technologies
with significantly higher capital labor ratios thnn actually have been
experienced will tend initially to make mistakes, and will experie!lce a
considerable amount of learning costs before achieving significant gains in
output per worker.

Either research and development (learning before doing) or

learning by doing (certainly also a form of Rand D) is required to make the
isoquant more elastic beyond the experienced range.

Similarly I believe

that economists have been much too mechanical in their treatment of the returns
to education.
\

It seems a safe bet that a large sha~e cf the returns to higher
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education are tied up with the processes of technical advance and the chain
of economic adjustments there-by set.in train. 12
These conjectures can be read as a bet in favor of one of the models
in the neo-classical grab bag rather than another.

However until the conjectures

are proved one way or another, I would argue we really don't have much of a
theory.

One might take the position that we have a theory but no firm

knowledge of the parameter valueso

However if range of possible specifications

of the model is as great as it seems to be this point of view seems close to
meaningless.
Further, if technical change is important I suspect that the kind of growth
theory that we need is not in the current grab bag of neo-classical models as
described by Solow.

Our existing growth theory represents a rather straight

forward dynamizing of the very statical firm and industry of Schumpeter's
circular flow.

All that g?."owth theory adds is smooth and predictable growth

of inputs and teclmology.
of Schumpeter's Chapter 2.

Sooner or later we will need to encompass the world
Innovation and change are not predictable.

technologies purchased now are not the best.
others worse.

Some firms make better choices,

There are leaders and followers.

process not a static condition.

All

Competition is a dynamic

Nordhaus and Tobin comment pessimistically

on the chances of developing a Schumpeterian theory of growth.
Many economists agree with the broad outlines of Schumpeter's
vision of capitalist development, which is a far cry from the growth
models made nowadays in either Cambridge, Massachusetts, or Cambridge,
England. But visions of this kind have yet to be transformed into
a theory that can be applied to everyday analytical and empirical work.
I suspect it will not be hard once we put our minds to it.
One of the reasons we have not put our minds to it is that economists
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appreciate that, for all its difficulties, the nee-classical vision (I
suggest it really is not a theory in any meaningful sense) contains some
important germs of truth.
to profit opportunities.

It contains the notion that firms are not unresponsive
It is built around the notion that outputs

require inputs, and that part of what increases labor productivity is increase
in resources (principally capital) per worker.

Surely these we want to preserve.

But we do not need a full blown neo-classical theory to preserve these.
We can have them with a theory based on Schumpeterian foundations.
What might a neo-Schumpeter ian theory of growth look like?
seem reasonably clear.

The outlines

In the first place the theory must avoid the repre

sentative firm in competitive equilibrium allegory which demarks neo-classical
theory.

In a Schumpeterian growth model, at any time firms can be operating

using different technologies, with different unit costs, some making profits,
others making losses.

Competition is a process in which profitable firms

expand and are imitated, unprofitable ones drop out of business or find better
ways.

Such a model can 1 under certain assumptions have the equilibrium steady

state characteristics of nee-classical theoryo
model.

Winter has developed such a

But the "motion" of this kind of a model in a regime where new technology

is being introduced is Schumpeterian.

I have employed a simple model in this

. . to examine
.
.
. a 1 ess d eve 1 oped country. 13
spirit
growt h over time
in

The mo d e 1

generates Schumpeterian profits for the firms using the better technologies,
which provides the funds (savings?) for their expansion relative to the less
efficient firms, as well as the motivation.
Second, the model should distinguish between the kinds of capabilities
that are important in the routine steady state operation of equilibrium,

(
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and the kinds of capabilities that are required for effective innovation or
perceptive imitation.

In part the mix of capabilities possessed by a firm

may be a matter of luck; but certainly in part it is a matter of decision.
Firms can decide to hire scientists and engineers to try to develop new
technologies and to watch the developments of other firms, or they can decide
not to do that.

If the technology is ammenable to innovation and the firm

or its competitors finds something new and better, these capabilities will
pay off.

If technology is not tractable the firm with an Rand D establishment

will be saddled with costs but no benefits.

And the firm that did not hire

the R and D capability will make the profits.

Undoubtedly R and D fortunes

fluctuate and so therefore do the capabilities of firms that are associated
with being profitable.
Sidney Winter and I are developing a model which incorporates these
14
elements.
Growth, profits, and capital formation are all generated largely
by innovation.

The industry at any time is characterized by a distribution

of firms using different technologies, having different profitabilities ,
and expanding or contracting at different rates.

Firms also differ in the

probability that they will create an innovation, or adopt better technology
used by others, over a given time period.

Not all innovations are superior

to existing technology, so the selection process is a key part of the model.
Better technology, when it is created, is spread through the system both by
expansion of the innovating firm and by imitation.

Rising capital intensity

is induced in the model through the effects on the dynamic selection system
of increases in the wage rate, which makes profitable more capital intensive
technology, if it is created.
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Obviously this is a much more complicated theory than the nee-classical
theory.

What are the advantages?

Note first that this theory can explain

aggregate data at least as well as can the nee-classical theory;

Winter's

demonstration that this kind of a model can generate competitive equilibrium
quarantees that nee-classical results can be replicated.

This kind of a

model may do better with aggregate data but its real advantages lie in
ability to be consistent with, and perhaps to explain, disaggregated data
and "to square with" observed process.

It is our bet that real understanding

of how growth occurs, and of how to influence it~ can be won only after
one has stripped off the surface level of aggregate data and looked at the
individual units, and understand what they really are doing.

15
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Footnotes

1.

In particular there is the important study of Griliches and Jorgenson (1967),
discussion of this work by Denison (1969), and the attempt at reconciliation
by Griliches and Jorgenson (1970). Nadiri recently has presented a general
discussion of the growth accounting literature.

2.

See for example the cautious remarks of Kendrick.

3.

Solow makes use of these same stylized facts.

4.

This is stressed in the work of Griliches and Jorgenson.

5.

Griliches and Jorgenson seem to claim this. The original statement of the
correctness of the Divisia formula seems to be Richter's.

6.

Thus under the stylized data assumption assuming a Cobb-Douglas initially,
using initial factor shares to weight percentage factor increases, and using
the Divisia index, all amount to the same thing.

7.

That is the "shares" need to be written explicitly as a function s ( r{t), A(t) ).
1
Equation (2) needs to be specified with Si( K (t), A(O) ). The Richter

1

specification of Equation (2) does not do this.

8,

Consider for example a Cobb-Douglas of the form:

Q = AKl/21 1/2
Assume that over a half century A doubled, and Kand L both quadrupled. Q
then would increase by a factor of eight. Each factor, had it alone changed,
would have caused a doubling of output. However given that capital and labor
grew as they did, output would have increased only four-fold had technology
not changed. Thus technical change would account for a four-fold increase
in growth if its contribution was estimated as a residual over the total
period. From another perspective, average yearly growth rates of A, K and L,
and Q would have been 1. 4%, 2. 8%, and 4. 2%. The sum of the "average yearly
contributions" of each factor would add up to total average yearly growth.
But note that in the final year the contribution of any of these factors
taken alone would have been only one fourth as much as it actually was had the
other factors remained constant over the entire period.
9.

10.

This is so for models that aggregate capital and which "quality adjust"
labor. Not all of the neo-classical models are of this kind.
For a similar discussion see Fellner (1970).
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11.

Fellner (1970) makes a similar point.

12.

For models in this spirit see Nelson and Phelps, and Welch.

13.

Nelson (1968).

14.

For a discussion in more detail of certain aspects of our modeling see
Nelson (1971).

15.

Relatedly we believe that progress toward a theory of growth will require
that different sectors be studied and treated separately.
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